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MARONITE CONFLICTS AND
THE RISE OF BASHIR GEMAYEL
EZRA T. CLARK

The
outbreak
of
the
second
Lebanese Civil War in 1975 and the
collapse
of
the
Lebanese
state
transformed Lebanon from a model
Middle
Eastern democracy
into a
notorious
example
of
anarchy,
factionalism, and repression.
Most
often
the
Lebanese conundrum is
explained
in
terms
of
religious
animosity
between
Muslims
and
Christians
and
as
a
political
struggle between the Left and Right.
Undoubtedly these have been the most
ostensible causes of the fourteen
year civil war. What is less known,
however, is the extent to which the
Muslims
and Maronites
have been
ripped apart by competing internal
fact ions.
Wi thin
the
Maroni te
community, the struggle for power at
the beginning of
the Civil War
exacerbated long-standing feuds that
had existed since the creation of the
National Pact in 1943.
One curious
phenomenon of the Civil War was that
once
the
shooting
began,
intrareligious killing also
became more
prevalen t".
In fact, the f ree-forall mentality of the Civil War, it
appears,
gave Bashir Gemayel the
opportunity to consolidate his power
and eliminate his rivals for the 1982
presidential election.
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Outbreak of Civil War
In
order
to
understand
the
changes that occurred within the
Maronite community, it is important
to understand the drastic changes
that took place in Lebanon as a
whole.
Before 1975, Lebanon was
considered the business, cultural,
and democratic center of the Arab
world.
However, the Lebanese Civil
War changed all this.
By most accounts, the Lebanese
Civil War began at Ain Rummaneh, a
Chr istian suburb of East Bei rut on
April
13,
1975.
At
a
Sunday
gather ing, unknown assailants fired
on Pierre Gemayel, leader of the
Maronite Phalanges and killed two of
his
bodyguards.
Hours
later,
Phalange militiamen ambushed a bus
full of Muslim political activists.
Twenty-eight
passengers
were
massacred (see Khalidi 1979, 47).
Throughout
the
country,
clashes
broke-out between maronite military
groups and members of the Muslimdominated National Movement.
The
fighting
gradually
snowballed.
By September 1975, two
chief
belligerents
emerged:
the
predominantly
Christian
Lebanese
Front ann the Nationalist Movement,
comprised of Druzes, Shiites, Sunnis
and Lebanese Communists. In December
of the same year,
the Palestine
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Liberation
Organization
(PLO)
officially entered the war.
The
reason the PLO hesi tated for over
seven months was most likely a result
of wanting to avoid overt war with
the Maronites. In the first year of
the war, nearly 50,000 Lebanese were
killed (McDowall 1983, 50).

Internal Maronite Conflicts
A significant source of friction
between the Lebanese Christians and
non-Christians was the National Pact
of
1943,
an
agreement
between
President Bishara aI-Khouri and Prime
Minister Ryad al-Sulh requiring that
the major government positions be
divided
among
Lebanon's
largest
religious sects.
As the largest
religious faction in Lebanon, the
Maronites,
with
52
percent
of
population (according to the 1932
census--the only official census in
Lebanese history), were guaranteed
the presidency (see McDowall 1983,
11).
The institutionalization of
government
positions
created
stability for over thirty years among
the Muslims, Christians, and later
the Palestinians; however, in the
short
run,
a
fractur ing
effect
occurred
within
the
Maronite
community.
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The Maroni te communi ty, perhaps
the
most
politically
visible
religious
group
in
"Lebanon,
historically has been plagued by
inveterate family and presidential
rivalries.
In fact, in the typical
Middle Eastern pattern of patriarchal
leadership, the major factions within
the
Maroni te
communi ty
coalesced
around a political strongman who, in
most cases,
was either a former
president of the Lebanese Republic or
a
prominent
politician
with
presidential aspirations.
Indeed,
the presidency was the crowning jewel
in any Maronite family's treasure
chest. With the presidency carne the
prestige
of
international
recognition, the ability to solidify
political alliances, and the means to
dispense patronage.
In fact, in
order to understand the effects of
the institutionalized presidency, it
is
important
to
understand
the
history of rivalry between the major
Maronite factions and the changes
that took place in Lebanese society.
A combination of these factors as
well as the 1975 Civil War account
for Bashir Gemayel's rise to power.

Chamoun's National Liberal Party
Following World War II, the most
influential
Maronite
leader
was
Camille Chamoun, the president and
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founder
of
the
National Liberal
Party. With his British connections
and his pro-Arab positions, he was
respected by Arabs and Maronites
alike.
In fact, Chamoun's strong
Arab views helped him defeat his
political rival Hamid Franjieh in
1952 after President Bishara alKhouri resigned (see Deeb 1980, 25).
However,
during
Chamoun's
presidency his relationship with the
muslim community declined. According
to Marius Deeb, "(Chamoun) did not
have a stable working partnership
(between 1952 and 1956) with a strong
Muslim leader as prime minister"
(Deed 1980,
26).
Also, Chamoun
exploi ted
Maroni te
fears
that
Nasserism
was
undermining
the
independence of Lebanon. As part of
his plan to protect Lebanon from the
pervasive influence of Nasserism and
Pan-Arabism, Chamoun announced his
acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine
in 1957.
By
accepting
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine (which enabled U.s. allies
to request mili tary· help from the
United States) Chamoun placed Lebanon
in open opposition with Egypt and
Syria.
Consequently,
Chamoun
disillusioned his Sunni Muslim allies
and
atomized
Maronite
political
unity. ·Conservative Maronites, such
as Raymond Iddi, Pierre Gemayel and
Charles Malik supported Chamoun's new
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stand,
However, prominent Christian
leaders 1 ike Hamid Franj ieh, Henr i
Far'un,
and Charles Hilu openly
criticized
him for placing the
government on a collision course with
Egypt and Syr ia (see Cobban 1985,
86) .

The Shihabist Party
The U.S. Marines landed in Beirut
in July 1958.
Arguing for Lebanese
domestic stability, the United States
pressured Chamoun not to run for an
unprecedented second term. with U.S.
support,
General
Fuad
Shihab
reluctantly agreed to run for the
presidency.
In the 1958 elect ion,
Shihab received nearly seven times
the votes of his opponent Raymond
Iddi.
The Shihabist era covered both
Shihab's own term (1958-64) and that
of his successor and disciple Charles
Hilu (1964-70). The primary concern
of the Shihabist governments was the
economic
development
of
Lebanon.
During
this
period
the
Lebanese
Christians took advantage of their
tradition of commercial and financial
expertise. Vast amounts of fugitive
Arab capital flowed into Beirut--the
bastion
of
stability
in
the
tumultuous
Middle
East.
The
Shihabist governments catered to the
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merchant classes by lifting foreignexchange
controls
and
enacting
banking secrecy laws.
Undoubtedly, Lebanon during the
Shihabist
era
experienced
great
economic gains.
However, a small
portion
of
the
populace
reaped
inordina te economic benef i ts.
For
example, during the 1960s, 4 percent
of the population disposed of 32
percent of the GNP.
The bottom 50
percent accounted for only 18 percent
of GNP (McDowall 1986, 13).
Also, the Lebanese geo-political
landscape changed considerably. From
1930 to 1980, Beirut increased in
population by tenfold. By 1977, only
39 percent of Lebanon I s population
was
rural.
Consequently,
the
infamous "Belt of Misery" encircled
prosperous Beirut (and also Tyre,
Tripoli, and Sidon) in a ring of slum
and squatter areas.
The Maronites, like every group
in
Lebanon
during
the
1960s,
struggled to adapt politically to the
significant
political
changes.
Increasingly, many Christians and
most
non-Christians
viewed
the
Shihabists as the party of the jetset Beirut socialites (see Cobban
1985, 95).
The Maronite Community
became more visibly divided between
the mountain and the city.
The
poorer, non-urban Maronites became
identified with the more militant
59
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Phalange and Franjieh parties, Urban
Maronites, especially the merchant
and professional classes, advocated
tolerant
Arabic
policies.
Conversely, the less educated, rural
residents of Northern and Central
Lebanon
favored
a
less
tolerant
attitude towards the Arab World and
strongly
advocated
Lebanese
nationalism.
In fact, the gap separating the
Maroni te communi ty was widening so
rapidly during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, it seems that only an
event as threatening as the Civil War
could have re-united the Maronite
community.

The Franjieh Family
Another Maroni te poli tical leader
at the time of the Civil War was
SUlayman Franjieh who replaced his
brother, Hamin, as party leader in
the late 1950s. SUlayman Franjieh's
1970 election win over Shihabist
presidential candidate Ilyas Sarkis
was
something
of
a
surprise.
Franjieh's election was, in part, a
resul t of the non-urban Maroni tes'
political mobilization.
Howeyer,
Franjeih's
election
augured a disturbing trend within the
Maronite community. Because Franjieh
had
only
a
regional
political
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following near Zgharta, his clan's
headquarters,
he
naturally
had
difficulty
inspiring
his
fellow
countrymen and co-religionists.
As
tensions mounted in the early 1970's,
Maronite paramilitary groups began to
act individually on behalf of the
state (see Stoakes 1975, 221). In
short, Franjieh's inexperience and
manipulability created a vacuum that
Bashir Gemayel and his Phalangist
military were eager to fill.

The Phalange Party
The rise of the Phalange Party,
led by the Gemayel family,
was,
perhaps,
the
most
interesting
development
within
the
Maronite
community since the creation of the
Na t ional Pact,
Before the Phalange
Party's emergence, the schisms within
the Maroni te communi ty stemmed, as
already
mentioned
primarily
from
familial,
geographic,
and
socioeconomic differences.
The Phalange
changed the political battle into a
military war.
The Phalange party was organized
in
1936
by
Pierre
Gemayel,
a
pharmacist.
Gemayel patterned the
party organization after the Sokol
youth
groups
he
observed
while
visiting Germany for the 1936 Olympic
Games. During the first years of its
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existence, the party was essentially
an apolitical youth athletic club.
However,
the 1958 Civil War
politicized the party and increased
Phalangist clout. From mid-September
to mid-October 1958, the Phalanges
kidnapped
travellers,
killed
and
tortured people found in the "wrong
areas," and participated in some of
the bloodiest events of the 1958
Civil War (see Cabban 1985, 91).
Also, the Phalanges were able to
successfully call for mass strikes in
certain parts of Greater Beirut in
order to challenge the authority of
the new Shihabist regime. Before the
end of October 1958, Shihab decided
to placate the Phalanges by including
them for the first time ever in
Lebanese government.
According to
historian Samir Khalaf the 1958 war
"enlarged the political constituency
of the party and transformed it from
a paramilitary youth movement into a
disciplined and highly organized mass
party" (89).
Interestingly, Phalangist military
prowess in both the first and second
civil wars propelled the Phalangists
into power.
In fact, it seems that
the Phalange has excelled the most
politically during times of civil
war.
For example, some experts
believe -that without the first or
second civil wars, the Phalange would
not have had a realistic chance at
the presidency (Haddad 1983, 118).

62

THE RISE OF BASHIR GEMAYEL
During the late 1960's and early
1970s the Phalangists relied more
heavily on their military prestige
and
anti-Palestinian
rhetoric.
Reflecting
the
party's
antiPalestinian
viewpoint,
Bashir
Gemayel, in a 1979 interview said, "I
am in favor of any solution which
would
relieve
us
of
600,000
Palestinians ... We gave them all the
necessary facilities. The result of
their ingratitude was the war of '75"
(Gemayel 1979, 58).
It appears that a combination of
anti-Palestinianism and the reckless
leadership of President Franjieh led
many
Phalangists,
especially
the
younger, more radical faction of the
party, to believe the Lebanese state
was incapable of dealing with the PLO
challenge and Muslim calls for a
redistribution
of
power.
Consequently, the party became more
willing to use its military prowess
to
enforce Maronite
hegemony
in
Lebanon.
In
other
words,
the
Phalangists
became,
by
selfdefinition,
"the
supervigilantes .•• builder, surrogate,
and
defender
of
the
state"
(Rabinovich 1984, 63).
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Rise of Bashir Gemayel
Without
question,
the
new
militaristic emphases in Phalangist
policies detailed nicely with Bashir
Gemayel's prescription for Lebanon's
ills.
In 1975, Bashir Gemayel, at
age 27, was a major player in the
Phalange Party. On August 30, 1976,
Bashir was elected commander of the
Joint Command Council of the Lebanese
Forces (Snider 1984, 8).
Bashir
succeeded William Hawi,
who was
killed while inspecting his troops at
Tal Zaatar on July 13, 1975. Hawi's
death was so fortunate for Bashir's
career,
that many Lebanese were
convinced that he was responsible
(see Randal 1980, 115). Considering
Bashir's proclivity for temerarious
behavior, it is not surprising that
the party elders, including Pierre
Gemayel, only hesitatingly endorsed
him in his new position as the
commander of the Lebanese Defense
Forces (Randal 1983, 115).
However,
if the party elders
feared Bashir would usurp power from
them, they were mistaken. Bashir, it
would appear, had no intention of
taking over the party that his father
had built; instead, with his military
power, . Bashir
built
his
own
organization. According to Jonathan
Randal the men who comprised the
Lebanese Forces "were Bashir' s men
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and not those of his father's and his
brother's party' (Randal 1983,118).
This is important because Bashir
knew he could count on his own men to
consolidate power and eliminate his
political and military rivals.
In
fact, on at least two occasions,
Bashir massacred those whom he felt
stood
between
himself
and
the
presidency.
For example, in June 1978 about
one-hundred of Bashir's men attacked
the Franjieh house in Zgharta and
killed Tony Franjieh, commander of
the Marada Br igade.
Bashir excused
his actions as a legitimate mistake.
However, the fact that Tony Franjieh
was
the
heir
to
the
Franjieh
political dynasty and Bashir's chief
Maronite
military
rival
makes
Bashir's
claim
seem
almost
ridiculous.
The
bloodiest
of
Bashir's
consolidating efforts occurred on
July 7, 1980, when troops under his
command simultaneously attacked the
barracks, offices, and storehouses of
Camille
Chamoun's
Tiger
militia,
killing approximately 500 Christians.
Despite the immediate outrage
from
the
majority
of
Christian
Lebanese, Bashir's ruthless tactics
appeared. to payoff in the long run.
The remnants of the Tiger mili tia
were
absorbed
into
the
Lebanese
Defense Forces, and, for the first
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time,
the
Maroni tes
of
cent ral
Lebanon were united by a single
organization.
According to Lewis
Snider, "With the elimination of the
Chamounist militia, the autonomous
existence of the or iginal mili tias
carne to an end. This meant that the
political
groups
comprising
the
Lebanese forces no longer had any
independent military structures of
their own" (Snider 1984, 10).
Despite his ruthless military
tactics, Bashir displayed political
advantage.
In less than 6 years,
Bashir built an organization that
threatened
the
existence of
the
Lebanese
s ta te.
Under
his
leadership,
the
Lebanese
Defense
Forces became more than just a loose
amalgamation of family militias. By
1982, the LDF had its own foreign
affairs
department
with
representation
in
major
world
capi tals
and
a
public
services
department
with
civilian popular
committees in villages and areas
controlled by LDF Forces.
These
committees provided a wide range of
public services: police protection,
public transportation, and water,
telephone, and electricity services;
moreover, under the aegis of the LDF,
there were agencies responsible for
the regu~ation of consumer prices as
well
as a
radio and
television
network (see Barakat 1988, 309-10).
Bashir was hated by the majority
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of his countrymen; but he was loved
and lionized by those who benefited
from his patronage.
Perhaps his
considerable accomplishments within
the Phalangist community caused the
leadership-starved Lebanese to flock
around
him--even
after
his
controversial election.
Within days after his election
Bashir began to feel confident enough
in his new role as president-elect to
distance himself from his Israeli
military allies. Also, according to
David McDowall,
Bashir
began
to
realize that if Lebanon were to be
re-uni ted,
he
must
forsake
his
bullying techniques and become more
moderate (see McDowall 1983, 17)

Lessons From Bashir Gemayel
Whether
Bashir
could
have
successfully ended the civil war had
he lived is a matter of conjecture.
Most likely he would have failed.
Although popular among the masses of
Lebanese Christians, Gemayel, as his
assassination proved, had powerful
poli tical enemies.
The Chamoun and
Franjieh
factions,
whose
support
Bashir would have needed, detested
him for the slaughter of their family
and party members.
Moreover, the
Israeli
and
Syrian
presence
in
Lebanon made it virtually impossible
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for anyone to have anything more than
regional control of the country.
Also, it was planned to use Gemayel
as a surrogate in ousting the PLO
from Beirut.
Of
course,
it
is
purely
speculative to discuss what might
have happened if Bashir had lived.
However,
such speculation can be
important in understanding what is,
perhaps, the heart of the Lebanon's
problem: The Maronites feel that they
are losing control of the state which
they
claim
they
almost
singlehandedly created. In fact, Maronites
often
justify
their
destructive,
belligerent behavior in words similar
to the following: "We made Lebanon,
we can destroy it."

Symbol of the Presidency
The Maroni tes have histor ically
been suspicious of Muslim loyalty to
the Republ ic of Lebanon.
In fact,
according to Kamal Salibi, before the
Republic of Lebanon was created in
1926, lithe Sunnites had pronounced
pan-Arab
sympathies,
and
their
leaders
clamored
for
union with
Syria,
which
was
predominantly
Sunnite"_ (1976,9).
Therefore,
from
a
his tor ical
perspective, it is understandable why
the Maronites view the presidency as
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a symbol of the state that belongs,
historically, to them.
In this way,
the presidency has been both a source
of
uni ty
and
division
for
the
Maronite community.
The
presidency
has
had
a
fracturing effect on the Maronite
communi ty in another way.
As the
formulator· of foreign policy, the
president must make decisions vis a
vis
the
Arab
world
that
could
exacerbate existing divisions inside
the Maronite political community.
This became clear shortly before
Bashir Gemayel's death as doubts
about the long-standing alliance with
Israel became a source of conflict.
Some Maronite leaders favored the
alliance while the majority did not.
According to Raymond Helmick, the
"whole issue (was) made dangerous
through the reaction of a third
group, which is bitter about the
alliance and ready to purge those
most associated with Israel" (Barakat
1988, 316).

The presidency has appeared to
di vide the Maroni tes in still one
other important way.
Any Maroni te
president who wants to truly be the
president of Lebanon must ultimately
decide whether he wishes to be a
Maroni te. poli tician or a statesman
for all Lebanese. This is a serious
dilemma because, according to Raymond
Helmick, "there is no consensus on
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whether or not to trust Muslims
sufficiently to try to build a joint
society.
For many leaders it is
still a matter of ambivalence; they
haven't decided" (Barakat 1988, 315).
This
ambivalence
prefaces
the
question that gets to the heart of
the Lebanese presidential dilemma: Is
the president the leader of all
Lebanese?
Or is the presidency an
institutionalized mechanism meant to
preserve the power and prerogatives
of the Maronite community? In other
words,
the
Maronites
must
ask
themselves how committed they are to
the idea of a pluralistic society.
The test of Lebanon's viability
will continue to be whether or not
the Maroni tes will view themselves
first as Lebanese and second as
Maronites. After the 1975 Civil War
began,
one of the first to try
reconciliation
with
the
Muslim
community
(after
he
ruthlessly
consolidated his power within the
Maronite
community)
was
Bashir
Gemayel,
Whether Bashir' s attempts
to mend relations with the Muslim
Lebanese led to his assassination is
still
a
matter
of
conjecture.
However,
killing
poli ticians
who
favor
reconciliation
between
the
confessional groups is a familiar
phenomenon
in
Lebanese
politics.
Both Bashir Gemayel and Rene Moawad's
assassinations seem to confirm this.
In conclusion, the symbol and
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quest for presidential power has
magnified existing tensions within
the Maronite community. Before 1975,
the presidency was very much a boon
for the Maronite community. However,
after the Civil War began, bullets
rather
than
ballots
determined
Maronite leadership.
Consequently,
Maronite political rivalries became
more treacherous.
Bashir Gemayel
took advantage of the donnybrook
mentality of the Civil War and used
the LDP's military prowess to solve
the problem of Maroni te leadership
success ion.
In
short,
an
understanding of the divisions within
the Maronite community help diagnose
what might be considered Lebanon's
disease: the subordination of the
nation's good for the amelioration on
factional well-being.
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